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CLERK SUPREME COURT
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN TIERRA CORPORATION et al, ]
Plaintiffs-Appellants
vs
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant-Appellee

]i PETITION FOR REHEARING
]
|
]

Docket No. 9000186

]

Pursuant to the Provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules
of Appellate

Procedure, the Defendant-Appellee

petitions

the Court for rehearing in the above-entitled matter. The
decision

of

the

Court was

filed May

5, 1992. In that

decision the Court overlooked or misapprehended points of
fact and law and thus erred in the following particulars:
1.

The Court failed to consider the uncertainty

its ruling will create for future "statute of
limitations" issues in "class action" cases.
2.

The Court improperly found the statute of

limitation to be tolled even before the theory of
recovery these plaintiffs advocate was filed.
3.

The Court improperly concluded that some of

these Plaintiffs for some of their claims would
have been included in the Call "class", when in
fact the impact fee was paid after this case was
filed and was appealed.
4.

The Court misapplied and misconstrued cases

from the federal court system.

I
THE COURT'S DECISION ADDS UNCERTAINTY,
INEQUITY AND CONFUoION TO THE LAW FOR FUTURE CASES
There is an ancient maxim: "Hindsight is always better
than

foresight."

This

is

certainly

true

of

judicial

decisions. In carefully examining what did happen in this
case,

the

Court

failed

to

overlook

the

impact

of

its

announced decision on future cases.
One

of the

holdings

of

the Court can be

succinctly

stated: The statute of limitation is tolled in favor of the
claims of putative class members until the appellate court
expressly resolves the "class action" issues. In this case,
the tolling of the statute extended from February 1978 to
July 198 6
time

over EIGHT YEARS, which was double the amount of

(4-years)

the

Court

has

now

stated

the

applicable

statute of limitation for this case.
In

this

case

Judge

Winder

DENIED

"class

action"

certification in April 1978. Under the Court's holding, the
statute was tolled and remained tolled until the Call III
(727 P. 2d 180, Utah 1986) was announced in July 1986. What
would have happened if the Call plaintiffs had not appealed?
Would the statute continue to be tolled? What if the Call
plaintiffs had only appealed up through Call II
1257
merely

(Utah

1980)

tried

the

and

following

case

and

let

remand
stand

(614 P. 2d

of that case, had
the

trial

court's

determination on the merits of the case? Would the statute
be tolled? Perhaps; perhaps not. The defect in the Court's
decision is that the answers to these rhetorical questions

are simply not answerable.
The

Court's

resolving

this

decision

case

effective

merely

leads

to

in

hindsight

uncertainty

in
and

injustice for future cases. The Court has justified its
ruling on issues such as "judicial economy" and "equity".
The City of West Jordan submits that when the Court properly
analyzes the practical effect of its decision, neither of
those two justifying reasons will be served.
For example, if the "class action" certification was
denied in Call at the trial court level, the putative class
members have several options: they can seek to intervene or
they can file their own actions. This Court has now given
them a third option: to wait. Now there is no incentive for
them

to

file

their

actions,

because

the

statute

of

limitation is tolled. OR IS IT? Under the Court's announced
ruling, it is tolled if there is an appeal. But at that
early stage

even following remand as in Call II

there is

no guarantee that there will be an appeal of the "class
action" issue. Thus, the putative class members MUST file
their separate actions or promptly move to intervene; those
class members cannot rely on the tolling of the statute
because the statute is tolled only if the representative
parties

choose to appeal. Thus, the issue of "judicial

economy" is certainly not legitimately served.
Similarly

the

"equity"

issue. The defendant in the

class action certainly isn't "placed on notice" as to the
claims of the putative class members in such a situation.
And there certainly isn't any "equity" in a situation where
3

the

running

(or tolling) of the statute

is strictly a

function of the attitudes and legal judgment of the named
parties'

counsel,

as

he

attempts

to

represent

unnamed

parties not before the court. The parties, and even future
parties, to litigation or future litigation, ought to be
able to know whether or not the statute is running or not.
Under the Court's announced ruling, such is not the case.
Those parties simply do not know. If the plaintiff (in the
unsuccessful class action certification) appeals the denial,
then the statute is tolled; if the plaintiff does not appeal
that denial, the statute is running

(ostensibly from the

date of the trial court's denial of certification). Although
in this case it is easy to discern that the plaintiffs in
Call appealed, it is impossible to tell in future cases
whether the plaintiff in a case will appeal or not. It is
impossible to tell whether the appeal will be on the "class
action" question.
This

uncertainty

raises

serious

ethical

and

jurisprudential issues. Most significant is the fact that
the running
moment
actions

of
of

(or tolling) should be determinable, at any
time, and not be contingent upon the future
a

private

"class" members which

litigant

attempting

the attorney

to

represent

has no authority

to

represent. [Once the "class" certification has been denied,
the plaintiffs ought not to seek to represent parties not
before the court. To allow them to continue to do so borders
on unprofessional solicitation.] In such a situation, is the
verdict at the trial court "for sale". Those trial court

proceedings

could

last

several

litigation, the case was tried

years;

in

five

years

after

Call

following two appeals on

the merits and two interlocutory appeals
almost

the

the

in late 1983,

original

filing

of

the

litigation. If no appeal was to be taken following the
trial, the case would be over and the claims of the putative
class members would have been barred by the 4-year statute
of limitation.
This

undesirable

situation

is

illustrated

by

two

hypotheticals: #1. Let us assume the Call plaintiffs had
prevailed in the trial court on the merits of their claim
and proved the impact fee, as applied to those plaintiffs,
was "unreasonable" and the trial court ordered the entirety
of the fee refunded. The plaintiffs wouldn't have grounds to
appeal because those plaintiffs received everything they
sought in the litigation. They

having won

shouldn't be

allowed to appeal strictly on the denial of the "class"
certification: why should those successful plaintiffs be
allowed to prolong litigation merely because their attorney
wants to represent more parties, ostensibly to increase his
professional

fee? Now, the dilemma. After five years of

litigation, the plaintiffs have prevailed on the merits, but
the

statute

of

similarly-situated

limitations

would

bar

the

claims

of

plaintiffs who have not filed. Should

plaintiffs' counsel be tempted by the prospect of holding
out for a settlement in excess of the actual judgment in
favor of the named parties? Should the defendant in that
case be held hostage by the fact that if there is an appeal,
5

the statute is tolled; if, however, the case is settled and
there is no appeal, the statute of limitations runs and the
similar claims of other parties are cut off?
The second hypothectical: what is the result

if the

basis for the denial of class action certification is that
the

trial

court

finds

the

representative

parties

will

inadequately represent the interests of the putative class
members? Should the statute be tolled in that situation (and
thus benefit those class members) when the trial court has
ruled

the representative parties should NOT represent the

class members?

Certainly

not! And yet such is the result

allowed by this Court's announced ruling.
It is incredible that the Court would fashion a rule
which leads to such inequitable results.
The rule followed by the United States Supreme Court
that

(the

denies

statute

class

is tolled

action

only

certification)

until

the

trial

does

not

suffer

court
that

defect. It should be followed in this case.
II
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
"NO PUBLIC HEARING11 CLAIM WAS NOT FILED
UNTIL MARCH 1981, WHEN THE STATUTE HAD
ALREADY EXPIRED FOR MANY OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
Although the original complaint in Call was filed in
February 1978, the claim that "there was no public hearing
preceding the adoption of the impact fee ordinance" was not
filed until March 1981! By that time, the 4-year statute of
limitations had already run against many of the Plaintiffs'
claims. The Call complaint did NOT contain the "no public

hearing"

allegations

until

the

trial

court

allowed

an

"amended" complaint to be filed in proceedings on remand
following Call II.
One of the major justifications in tolling the statute
of

limitations

as

advanced

by the Plaintiffs

and

even

accepted by the Court is that the Defendant is "placed on
notice" as to the nature of the substantive claim which is
advanced by the representative parties. The Court's ruling,
in essence, resurrects the then dead claims and literally
"turns back the clock". Such should not be the case! To
allow

this

result

in

this

case

will

merely

encourage

litigants to make every case a "class action": to do so
costs so little to allege (even if unsuccessful) and tolls
the

statute

of

limitations

for unnamed

parties to the

original litigation even for causes of action which were not
at issue in the original litigation 1 Such a result cannot be
condoned.
The Court should not allow the "clock to be turned
backwards", but should rule that the statute is tolled in
favor of the class members ONLY AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS
PLACED ON NOTICE AS TO THE NATURE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM
UPON

WHICH

THESE

PLAINTIFFS

SEEK

TO

RECOVER;

to

hold

otherwise obviously defeats the legitimate public policy
issues justifying statutes of limitation. If this is done,
it has the effect of barring most of the Plaintiffs' claims,
as shown below:

Date
Nov
Feb
May
Jun
Sep
Aug
Aug
Aug

Subdivision
76
77
77
77
77
78
78
78

Plaintiff

Months prior
to March '81
Arnold Development
51+
American Tierra
48+
American Tierra
45+
American Tierra
44+
Arnold Development
41+
Brighton Builders
30+
Arnold Development
3 0+
Covecrest Properties 30+

Nottingham Moor
McHeather
Cathleen
Jordan Grove #5
Dimondville
Lessley Estates
Linsey Estates
Vista Via

[Note that recovery by R & D Engineers for impact fees paid
for Magic Valley #2 subdivision was barred by the statute of
limitations apart from this analysis and is not considered
further in this brief.] The "months" column indicates the
number of months from the time the Developer paid the impact
fee until March 4, 1981, when the amended complaint was
filed in Call. [These calculations assume that the impact
fees were paid on the last calendar day of the month

the

date most favorable to the Plaintiffs.] That coupled with
the 15-month period [from 23 July 1986 when Call III was
announced to 4 November 1987 when the instant complaints
were filed] effectively pushes most of the claims beyond the
48-month (4-year) statute of limitation applicable for these
claims.

[The issue of whether the three developers which

paid an impact fee in August 1978

after the Call case had

been filed, decided at the trial court level and appealed to
the Supreme Court
This
especially

will be discussed at Point III, below.]

"placed
in

the

on

notice"

context

issue

that

is

the

significant,

Call

plaintiffs

originally

(through Call I and Call II) maintained that

there

"no

was

ordinance.

Only

statutory

authority"

after

II

Call

was

for

the

impact

announced

did

fee
the

plaintiffs come up with the "no public hearing" issue. [The
Call plaintiffs had their "one shot" at the City to come up
with the reasons why the West Jordan impact fee ordinance
was

invalid.

They

having

failed

in

their

attempt

to

establish the invalidity of the ordinance on their first
attempt
their

(Call I)
complaint

should not have been allowed to amend
to

allege

new

grounds

for

the

facial

invalidity of the ordinance, when those should have been
raised in the original complaint prior to Call I. That they
were allowed to do so, successfully under Call III, does
violence to the concept of "judicial economy" and the idea
that a party must file all causes of action arising out of a
single incident or forego pursuing those unfiled claims.
Rule 18, U.R.Civ.P.
If the Court

is inclined to "toll" the statute of

limitations, the tolling period should begin no earlier than
the date

(4 March 1981) on which the Defendant received

notice of the substantive claims upon which the Plaintiffs
now seek to recover. The Court should not "roll back the
clock" to resurrect claims which had been already barred.
Ill
THE DEVELOPERS WHO PAID THE IMPACT FEES
IN AUGUST 1978 SHOULD NOT BE DEEMED TO
HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF THE PUTATIVE CLASS
The Court in its opinion mistakenly assumes that the
Plaintiffs which paid fees in August 1978 would have been
members of the putative class in Call. The original Call
complaint was filed in February 1978. The class action
issues were decided by the trial court (Judge Winder) in

April 1978; summary judgment was granted in favor of the
City on the merits of the claim in May 1978 and the case was
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court in a timely fashion. [The
plaintiffs' Appellants' Brief was filed in August 1978.]
Thus, the case was well under-way and decided by the time
the Plaintiffs paid their impact fees in August 1978. Those
putative class members who pay their impact fee after the
case is filed should not be construed to be class members.
There must be a finality

a definiteness

in the law. Under the Court's ruling

a predictability
(which gives them

benefits as though they were not only described in the class
action allegations but also as though the class was actually
certified to include them) there would never be a statute of
limitation, because the size of the class was constantly
expanding, as new parties paid their fees.
In that context, it is interesting

to

imagine the

effect if the result had been different: for example, what
if

the

trial

court had

certified

the class, but found

nevertheless that the ordinance was valid as in Call I? Had
there been no appeal and merely a judgment on the merits (or
had the proceedings terminated

immediately

following the

Call I decision), those future class members would be bound
by

the

decision

upholding

the

facial

validity

of

the

Ordinance. As class members of the putative class they would
be bound by principles of res judicata from asserting claims
(including the "no public hearing" issue) which could have
been asserted in Call I but which weren't. Thus, we have the
anomalous situation that a potential plaintiff is barred

from asserting a claim

a claim that wasn't even litigated-

—even before his cause of action arises. If that had been
the

situation

from

the

Call

I

decision,

it

would

be

interesting to see if the August 1978 would be so anxious to
find shelter within the "class" which was never certified.
For
result:

such
a

advantage

issues

there ought to be a mutuality of

future

party-litigant

ought

not

while

the

party

suffers

opposing

be

gain
from

an
a

disadvantage,
IV
THE COURT'S DECISION INCORRECTLY RELIES UPON
DISTINGUISHABLE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS AND CREATES
AN APPROACH INCONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE CASE LAW
The

Court's

decision

cites

to

four

federal

court

decisions on the issue of the tolling of the statute pending
appeal. Each of those cases is distinguishable from the
present situation.
In

West

Haven

School

District

vs

Owens-Corning

Fiberglas, 721 F.Supp. 1547 (D.Conn. 1988) the former action
which

tolled

the

statute

involved

a

class

which

was

certified. In the instant case, the putative "class" was
NEVER CERTIFIED.
In Jimenez vs Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975),
the putative class members sought to intervene promptly
after the denial of the class action certification. The
appealed issue was the denial of leave to intervene, not
the specific denial of class action status. This point is
made clear in Footnote #12 of the decision, 523 F.2d at 696,
where the Seventh Circuit wrote:

There was no occasion for the Court to
consider any question of tolling after
refusal to certify in a case in which
the absent class members r^ade no timely
effort to assert their rights directly.
523 F.2d at 696. Emphasis added.
Davis vs Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 600 F.Supp. 1312
(D.Maryland 1985) should be cited for the proposition that
although the statute may be tolled during the pendency of
the

appeal, the

appeal period
and

ambiguous

statute

is NOT tolled

even during

the

if the representative claims are so vague
as

to

fail

to give the defendant

adequate

notice. When applied to the instant case, Davis stands for
the principle that the tolling period should not begin until
4 March 1981.
Byrd vs Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.Supp.
(D.Miss.

1987)

is

factually

distinguishable

on

342

several

points. First, the class action was certified originally by
the

trial

amendments
courts

court.

Only

after

several

redefinitions

and

effected by the trial court and the appellate

to that certification did the trial court rule the

statute began to run. The court expressly refused to extend
the tolling while subsequent appeals were pursued. Indeed,
the court wrote of a situation which is closely analogous,
when correctly analyzed, to the case at bar and the Call
case:
Inasmuch as the Fifth Circuit did not
disturb on appeal the district court's
redefinition of the class to exclude
black males, the court construes the
appropriate
final order to be the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on
Payne I in 1978. At that point in timef

the plaintiffs in this action were put
on notice that their rights were not
being represented by the class action
plaintiffs in Payne. If the plaintiffs
wished to intervene in Payne or to file
separate actionsf the appropriate time
to do so was after Payne I. Since the
Fifth Circuit ruling did not reverse or
otherwise disturb the district courts
order of December 8, 1976 redefining the
class in Payne to exclude black males,
plaintiffs had no basis for delaying
their intervention in Payne at the time
to seek the certification of a subclass
of black males. Nor were plaintiffs
justified in assuming the Fifth Circuit
might later require certification of a
subclass of black males when Payne went
up on appeal once again.
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Howe argues in dissent: that the statute began to run when
Call I was announced (December 26, 1979).
[As an addendum to this Brief is a photocopy of Pages
3 3 through 35, inclusively of Plaintiff's original Brief to
the

Utah

Supreme

Livingston.

The

Court,

entire

filed

Brief

in

should

Call

I

by

Valden

be on file

in the

Supreme Court records under Docket No. 15908. There may be
an

inadequate

record

presently

before

the

Court

as to

exactly what was argued in Call I. However, that failure
should fall solely upon the Plaintiffs. It is the Plaintiffs
who are claiming entitlement to the tolling of the statute.
Those Plaintiffs should prove both the factual and the legal
bases to entitle them to the tolling they claim.]
Thus, the four federal court decisions cited by the
Court to justify the extended tolling of the statute are
inappropriately analyzed. Those cases do not overrule the
applicable principles of non-tolling as announced by the
United States Supreme Court in American Pipe and in Crown,
Cork: that the tolling continues only until the trial court
entertains a motion to strip the action of its class action
character. The Davis opinion quotes from the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in United Airlines vs McDonald,
432 U.S. 385 at 394:
In short, as soon as it became clear to
the [plaintiffs] that the interests of
the unnamed class members would no
longer be protected by the named class
representatives, [they should have]
moved to intervene to protect those
interests.
675 F.Supp at 348. Bracketed material in original.
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ADDENDUM

John

Pages 33 through 35, inclusively
of BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Call and Clark Jenki ns vs City of West Jordan, Utah
1

IMI.I I"

Utah Supreme Court
Docket N~- l59 0 8

prosecute the action vigorously.
43 F.R.D. 465 (1965).

Mersay v. First Republic Corp.,

Both elements are present in this case.
POINT V

THIS ACTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED
AS A CLASS ACTION AS THE PREREQUISITES OF RULE 23(b) ARE PRESENT
In order to bring a class action, the plaintiffs must
satisfy all four of the requirements of Rule 23(a).

However,

plaintiffs need meet only one of the requirements of Rule 2 3(b) *
Albertsons, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.
1974).
A

»

Rule 23(b) (1) (A) — Inconsistent: or Varying Adjudications
With Respect to Individual Members of the Class Would
Create a Risk of Establishing Incompatible Standards of
Conduct for Defendant.
The focus of Rule 23(b((l)(A) is to protect the interest

of the party opposing the class.
Loan, 63 F.R.D. 631 (1974).

George v. United Federal Savings &

The purpose of the Rule is to protect

a defendant from the legal quagmire which might result if one court
were to order defendant to take certain action which another court
orders the same defendant not to take.

Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,

62 F.R.D. 124 (1973).
The Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 Amendments
to the FederaL Rules of Civil Procedure state:
Clause (A): One person may have rights
against/ or be under dutic-3 toward, numerous
persons constituH-,9 ": class, and be so
positioned that conflicting or varying

~ " indications in lawsuits with individual
members of the class might establish incompatible standards to govern his conduct.
The class action device can be used -.•••'••'-'
f^ectively to obviate the actual or
::tual cilemmn which would thus confront
» party opposing the class. The matter
I'ooi' stated thus: "The felt necessity
* a class action is greatest when the
_; arts are called upon to order or sanction
the alteration of the status quo in circum• ances such that a large number of persons
*•: in a position to call on a single
. • -"so" to alter the status quo, or to
•pi a.in if it is altered, and the
*sibility exists that [the] actor might
called upon to act in inconsistent ways."
Louisell & Hazard, Pleading and Procedure:
State and Federal 719 (1962); see Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356,
366-67 (1921) To illustrate: Separate
actions by individuals against a municipality
to declare a bond issue invalid or condition~
or limit it, to preventT~or limit the making
of a particular appropriation or to compel
or invalidate an assessment, might create
a risk of inconsistent or varying determinations. In the same way, individual litigations of the rights and duties of riparian
owners, or of landowners 1 rights and duties
respecting a claimed nuisance, could create
a possibility of incompatible adjudications.
Actions by or against a class provide a
ready and fair means of achieving unitary
adjudication. [Emphasis added.] Notes of
Advisory Committee on Rules, 39 F.R.D. 100 (1966).
It appears that the present case falls squarely v/ithin the Rule.
See also, Horst v, Guy, 21 1 N.W.2d

723 (J; 973 N . D . ) .

I n a s i ir •... •
.. I a i vf e i i i, c 1 a s 5 > a c t ,i„ o n s h a v e b e e i i u p h e 1 d u n d e
Rule 2 3 (b { (1) (A) on claims that, a utility has overcharged its
customers.

Cass C I ^ r Uic _ / JMort^western Public Service Co. ,

1° P. !;.f-vrv.2d 118 7 (1974) .

Finally, identical cases to the present one wherein
subdividers have brought suit against a municipality seeking to
have an ordinance requiring dedication of land or payment of money
declared invalid, have been maintained as a class action.

Citv of

Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 363 (Ala. 1978);
Cimarron Corp. v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 563 P.2d 946 (Colo.
1977).
CONCLUSION
Summary Judgment should be granted in favor of
plaintiffs and this case should be certified as a plaintiff class
action.
DATED this 18th day of August, 1978.

VALDEN P. LIVINGSTON
Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants
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